
Asset Identifier PHAU05340501
Address MARIE CURIE, 1-98,SCEAUX
GARDENS,SCEAUX GARDENS
ESTATE,CAMBERWELL
Post Code SE5 7DG



Code FRA-PB
Version 13
Description FRA-PURPOSE BUILT BLOCKS

Assessment Date 27/01/2020- Reviewed 11/05/21
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Assessor Name Richard Hennelly

1 CONTENTS

1.1 Contents

1.1.1	Contents	-
1.1.2	Introduction	-
1.1.3	Summary	-
1.1.4	General Building Information	-
1.1.5	Maintenance Schedules	-
1.1.6	Fire Hazards and their Elimination and Control	-
1.1.7	Fire Protection Measures	-
1.1.8	Management of Fire Safety	-

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Introduction

Responsible Person: London Borough of Southwark Council (LBS)

This Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) has been carried out by a competent Fire Risk Assessor on behalf of the Responsible Person (Southwark Council) in accordance with Article 9 of the requirements of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO). This report is an assessment of the risk to life from fire and does not address the risk to property or business continuity from fire. In compliance with the scope of the FSO this FRA is limited to the common areas of the premises. The site survey undertaken to produce the assessment is limited to a TYPE 1 (non-destructive) survey of common areas only, in accordance with the Responsible Person's instructions.

However, where it is deemed relevant, a sample dwelling(s) will be inspected to determine its relationship and dependence on the common areas to understand the nature of fire separation between dwellings and common areas. Further investigation may be required by qualified and competent individuals to ascertain the appropriate fitment and fire protection of encased shafts, ducts, risers or voids where a sampled non-destructive flat survey cannot confirm this. In accordance with the limitations of the FSO risk assessment; this report does not include an assessment of external flame spread unless it is identified as impacting on the fire safety of common areas.

However, the report may make reference to such issue and/or recommend further investigation and assessment if it has been identified as being relevant to the overall fire safety of the premises.

Where appropriate, the FRA will make recommendations to ensure compliance with relevant fire safety legislation. However, it should be understood that this assessment does not replace the Council's other obligations to carry out fire safety assessments such as those required by the Health and Housing Safety Rating System (HHSRS) assessment to dwellings under section 9 of the Housing Act 2004.

As this property is designated general needs, it may be assumed that tenants are typical of the general population. It may also be assumed that any specific requirements as regard disability and evacuation of tenants are brought to the attention of Southwark council. The scope of this assessment is limited to the common parts of the building as per FSO, therefore, areas within the dwellings, such as service ducts and ventilation facilities for kitchens and bathrooms, water and heating services were not accessed at the time of this inspection is therefore recommended that any future stock condition surveys or major works projects, take these areas into consideration and findings recorded and kept on file. Building contains sleeping occupants in protected dwellings.

It is not untypical of a social housing block for persons of various ages, physical & mental health abilities and behavioural styles to be in the premises by way of lawful and unlawful tenancies or visit. It is not practical to identify all such persons on the premises. It is expected that lone workers are informed of risks and have appropriate fire instruction & training. It has not been identified to the assessor of any specific individual person especially at risk from fire.

Persons at risk - As stated above, typically, the building will contain persons of various ages, physical and mental abilities and behavioural styles. At various times there may also be persons on the premises who are visitors to the block or there may be persons who have no legal right to be in the building. It is not practicable to identify all such persons who may be on the premises. It is expected that Lone Workers are informed of risks and have appropriate fire safety instruction and training. Other fire safety preventative options to assist vulnerable individuals may be considered through a 'Safe and Independent Living Assessment', the Resident Services Officer or through the Adaptions Team.

3 SUMMARY

3.1 Summary

3.1.1 Risk Rating

HIGH MODERATE

	LIKELIHOOD OF A FIRE				
CONSEQUENCE OF A FIRE	RARE	UNLIKELY	POSSIBLE	LIKELY	ALMOST CERTAIN
EXTREME	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SUBSTANTIAL	INTOLERABLE
MAJOR	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SUBSTANTIAL
MODERATE	TOLERABLE	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL
MINOR	TRIVIAL	TOLERABLE	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE	HIGH MODERATE
NEGLECTIBLE	TRIVIAL	TRIVIAL	TOLERABLE	TOLERABLE	LOW MODERATE

Trivial: These risks are considered acceptable. No further action is necessary other than to ensure that the controls are maintained.

Tolerable: No additional actions are required unless they can be implemented at very low cost (in terms of time, money and effort). Actions to further reduce these risks are assigned low priority. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained and monitored

Low Moderate: Consideration should be given as to lowering the risk where applicable, to a tolerable level, and preferably to a trivial level, but the costs of additional risk reduction measures should be taken into account unless these are managerial issues. The risk reduction measures should be implemented within a defined time period. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained and monitored.

High Moderate: Considerable efforts should be made to reduce the risk to a tolerable level, and preferably to a trivial level, but the costs of additional risk reduction measures may be taken into account unless these are managerial issues.

The risk reduction measures should be implemented within a defined time period. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained and monitored.

Substantial: Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be implemented urgently within a defined time period. Consideration should be given to suspending or restricting the use, or to apply interim control measures, until this has been completed. Controls should be maintained and monitored. Consideration should be given to consulting with the Enforcing Authority.

Intolerable: These risks are unacceptable. Substantial improvements in risk controls are necessary, so that the risk is reduced to a tolerable or trivial level. The activity should be halted until risk controls are implemented. If it is not possible to reduce risk the activity should remain prohibited. Enforcing Authority must be consulted.

3.1.2 Next Physical Assessment Due

2021

3 SUMMARY

For compliance with the FSO, fire risk assessments need to be reviewed periodically. The frequency of review is pre-determined by Southwark Council. The block subject of this assessment is on an 3 monthly schedule due to current risks.

The fire risk assessment needs to be reviewed sooner when,

- (1) There is a reason to suspect that the original fire risk assessment is no longer valid, e.g. after a fire that occurred within, or spread to, the common parts.
- (2) There is a significant change in the matters that were taken into account as the risk assessment was carried out, e.g. change in the type of residents occupying the block.
- (3) After completion of significant works to address shortcomings identified by the fire risk assessment.

A review of the FRA is recommended in 3 months to assess progress.

Senior Fire Safety Surveyor to monitor tasks. Next FRA review due August 2021.

Owing to advice given by Government relating to the Corona virus pandemic, Southwark Council has implemented certain measures with regards to undertaking FRAs. This has limited this FRA to a review by a Fire Safety Surveyor as the block is due to undertake Major Works as outlined in the LBS Temporary FRA Procedure, some of the tasks have been addressed with the implementation of mitigating factors (please see body of report).

Note: It must be noted that an intrusive fire risk assessment was completed by in March 2021. Various other passive fire safety surveys have been completed since last November to a dwelling and a void survey, as well as a recent fire strategy report which was completed in April 2021. All reports have contributed to creating a feasibility report which is in progress.

3.1.3	FRA Type	PB
3.1.4	Storeys Ground and Above	16
3.1.5	Storeys Below Ground	0
3.1.6	Units	98
3.1.7	Status	COMPLETE
3.1.8	Building Dimensions. Length, width and height.	

The building is approximately 45m (16 floors) from the ground to the to (habitable) upper floor surface in height, 65m in length and 15m wide giving a square footprint of 975m².

3.1.9	List any tasks that once completed can reduce the risk rating of this assessment.	
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The risk rating of this block has been reduced during this review for the reasons stated below to a HIGH MODERATE. This can be reduced to Low Moderate when all passive fire issues and external infill panel actions have been completed. Address the high risks as a priority (passive fire issues) to ensure risk is reduced as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained and monitored. The Responsible Person has been presented an action plan for these risks, they are assigned low/medium/high priority. It is vital that floors, walls and external walls are in good condition and that there are no openings that would permit the uncontrolled spread of fire and smoke so that the evacuation strategy can be reverted back to a 'stay put' approach.

It was also confirmed PRB Estates have completed some fire stopping works to the ground floor plant area and a floor within the suspended communal corridor ceiling. Other mitigating factors in risk reduction is, it was confirmed the extract system has been cleaned and intumescent vents installed to bathrooms (confirm all dwellings have been addressed).

FRA review May 2021 - Further intrusive survey to a void dwelling and intrusive fire risk assessment has identified further breaches in fire compartmentation.

3 SUMMARY

Following these reports, and consultation with LFB, a waking watch was introduced to the block in late November 2020, internal procedures were established in line with NFCC guidance, Simultaneous Evacuation Guidance to support a temporary change to a simultaneous evacuation strategy in purpose-built blocks of flats. The process of installation of the temporary fire alarm system has since progressed and is live (L5 system to communal areas with multi sensor heat detection within dwelling and an enhanced D1 LD1 system has been installed to dwellings). During this process the resident services officers (RSO) have established a list of vulnerable residents and where self-identified, personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPS) have been put in place. This is continually monitored with regular residents communications and an updated resident fire safety information pack distributed. Please see body of report for further details. LFB have been provided with the PEEPS and internal procedures for the block, they also conduct regular site visits.

Following the outcomes from further investigations of passive fire safety issues and any 3rd party surveys/reports, a full review of current 'stay put' strategy was required and changed in liaising with the local fire enforcing department, London Fire Brigade who were informed to ensure a pro active partnership

The change in evacuation strategy to a simultaneous evacuation has been achieved by implementation of waking watch and the installation of a communal fire alarm and detection system (L5). The waking watch responsibility has since changed to 'evacuation management' with the main role on assisting vulnerable residents in the block. The fire alarm and detection system is also remotely linked to an alarm receiving centre (ARC) all of which further mitigate against current risks with the fire compartmentation and external wall system. A combination of these short term measures (the time required to formulate a longer-term remediation plan) will assist in the reduction of the overall risk to HIGH MODERATE. LBS are in progress of developing a feasibility report and design on required works with consultation with residents.

The current arrangements must be able to account for the following functions:

- The early identification of a fire.
- Giving warning to residents.
- Management of the evacuation (including, calling the fire rescue service (FRS) and where necessary, PEEPs), and
- Take appropriate action as required by the management strategy, including meeting the FRS on arrival.

3.1.10 Does this assessment require a review? Yes No N/A

FRA review periods are predetermined based on building risk factors, unless the building specific FRA determines otherwise, however due to the risks identified, alteration of the review period set in the LBS FRA procedures have been identified in this FRA to 3 monthly reviews, next review due August 2021.

LBS feasibility study is currently in progress, using data from the various technical reports that have been prepared since last November, this will include assessing AOVs installation and/or potential retrofit of automatic fire suppression system (AFSS), taking into account guidance at the time. The study will also include the required works to improve the fire compartmentation/external wall system (EWS) and assess best practices. This should form part of a risk analyst approach on the overall holistic risk of the block and provide a proportionate to the risk approach to establish best safety solutions for residents. A separate fire strategy has been completed (April) in which should be read in conjunction with this FRA. All the other technical reports mentioned in this FRA are stored in the fire safety files for Maire Curie.

Areas not accessed during fire risk assessment inspection;

TRA Hall - Separate FRA in place
Cycle Hub - Separate FRA required
Some secured riser panels across the block
Internal dwellings

4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION

4.1 General Building Information

4.1.1 Building information

The building is constructed of a reinforced structural concrete frame, floor and roof slabs with structural concrete main cross walls, (intermediate cross walls are masonry). The external envelope of the building comprises the two main facades which are of brick & block with aluminum composite (containing some Phenolic material) infill panels, aluminium frame windows to odd numbered floors (accommodation entrance level). The escape balconies located at each even numbered level are constructed of concrete floor, a metal balustrade and infill panels to one side and brick/block construction to 1.1m high (confirmed on the lounge side) & aluminium frame windows and 30 minutes fire resisting doors, there is a UPVC panel to the exit door of one side of the balconies which was under 1.1m. Internal partition walls within the duplex flats are of masonry and stud partition construction. The lower level has two bedrooms and a bath/toilet. Upper level comprises a kitchen and lounge area separated by a timber and glazed partition (not fire resisting). There are two bin rooms at ground floor level served by rubbish chutes, chute hoppers are accessed from within a ventilated & protected chute room at odd numbered floor levels. The building is provided with a concrete single central protected staircase serving all floors and two passenger lifts which service all odd numbered floors.

Access to the building is via a secure main entrance on the ground floor giving access to the lift lobby (no stair access from this lobby). The staircase is accessed separately from the lifts via an external open stair through a secure door located at upper ground floor level.

The building forms a stand alone block of maisonettes over 16 floors (Grd + upper ground + 14 upper levels) containing 98 two storey maisonettes. The accommodation Front Entry Doors (FEDS) are located at each odd numbered floor level (lower level of Duplex) within two protected corridors, one corridor either side of the central lift lobby & escape stair. There are service risers at all levels within the lift lobbies and escape routes & a plant room on the roof containing lift motor & ventilation plant (No inspection due to ladder access).

The ground and upper ground floor area has no residential accommodation. The ground floor consists of an entrance lobby which is offset to the centre of the block. The undercroft houses a set of community areas (one side of the staircase/lift lobby area). The other side of the access areas are two refuse storage rooms, electrical intake & a store area. At upper ground floor level there is a residents community facility (Sceaux Gardens TRA Hall) with an additional linked hall and external escape stair. The residents facility has its own fire risk assessment and was not inspected as part of this assessment but must be considered when reading this report. The resident facility has an emergency exit which feeds into the main escape stair from the block at upper ground floor level (it was noted the TRA Hall has a automatic fire alarm and detection (AFD) system installed).

There is a lift lobby at ground floor and each odd numbered upper floor level, this is accessed at ground floor level via a door fitted with an electronic key/fob security access system provided with a drop key override.

4.1.2 Any further building comments?

4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION

Residential areas levels 1-14: There are 14 maisonettes occupying every two floor levels, starting at the 1st floor, with all front entry doors (FEDs) at odd numbered levels. The maisonettes FEDs are accessed from a protected corridor, 8 located to the right of the lift lobby/staircase and 6 to the left. Both corridors have security doors separating each corridor from the lift lobby and are fitted with electronic key/fob security devices restricting access (emergency services drop key provided). The escape stair serves all floors and is accessed at ground floor level via an open stair leading to a door at upper ground floor level fitted with an electronic key/fob security access system provided with an emergency services drop key override. The escape stair is also accessed via the lift lobbies, protected chute rooms (odd numbered floors) and protected escape routes (even numbered floors). The staircase is ventilated at the 14th floor via PV. The lift lobby at each odd numbered upper floor level contains a dry riser outlet (starting at 3rd floor level) and access to two lifts. This area is ventilated by double height PV, this ventilation is connected via an open void to the escape route at a level below. There is also a ventilated lobbied rubbish chute room accessed off the escape stair at odd numbered floor levels. The even numbered floors (2-14) serve as the alternative upper floor escape route to the maisonettes. Each of these floors and therefore each maisonette has two open balcony escapes (one to each side of the block) at these levels. All open balcony escapes enter a lobby area through a fire door fitted with a push pad lock. Then each lobby has access into the escape stair through a further fire door. A store room was found within each lobby to front side of the block. Internal accommodation within each maisonette is over two levels. Maisonettes have downstairs bedrooms and upstairs kitchen and lounge areas. There is a scissor configuration to the maisonettes internal stair so regardless of what side of the communal corridor the property is entered from, the upper floor of the dwelling spans the whole width of the building.

Maisonette layout: (FEDs on the odd numbered floors)

1st/2nd floor: flats 1-14

3rd/4th floor: flats 15-28

5th/6th floor: flats 29-42

7th/8th floor: flats 43-56

9th/10th floor: flats 57-70

11th/12th floor: flats 71-84

13th/14th floor: flats 85-98

There is a dry rising main serving all odd numbered floors starting at 3rd floor level and a sprinkler water suppression system had been installed within the ground floor bin rooms but now has been decommissioned. As this property is designated general needs, it may be assumed that tenants are typical of the general population. It may also be assumed that any specific requirements as regard disability and evacuation of tenants are brought to the attention of Southwark council. The scope of The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is limited to the common parts of the building, therefore, areas within the dwellings, such as service ducts and ventilation facilities for kitchens and bathrooms, risers for electrical, water and heating services were not accessed at the time of this inspection is therefore recommended that any future stock condition surveys or major works projects, take these areas into consideration and findings recorded and kept on file. Building contains sleeping occupants in protected dwellings. It is not untypical of a social housing block for persons of various ages, physical & mental health abilities and behavioural styles to be in the premises by way of lawful and unlawful tenancies or visit. It is not practical to identify all such persons on the premises. It is expected that lone workers are informed of risks and have appropriate fire instruction & training.

4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION

Images



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4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION



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4 GENERAL BUILDING INFORMATION



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5 MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES

5.1 Maintenance Schedules

5.1.1 Maintenance Schedules

All equipment relating to fire fighting and fire protection in the building are subject to scheduled maintenance which is recorded and stored off site. This maintenance will be in line with the requirements and test methods as given in the relevant British standard. This data is stored within Southwark database (not seen at time of assessment).

6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

6.1 Electrical Sources of Ignition

- 6.1.1 Are there reasonable measures taken to prevent fires of electrical origin? Yes No N/A
- 6.1.2 Are fixed installations periodically tested and inspected? Yes No N/A
- 6.1.3 Is the fuseboard/mains intake suitably fire resistant? Yes No N/A
- 6.1.4 Comments

Southwark Council undertake inspections and testing of the landlord's electrical installation. Records of any testing or maintenance are held on the Council's internal database, however this was not seen by surveyor at time of assessment. It has been informed that LBS strategy approach to fixed electrical wiring is under review, we advise robust testing and maintenance regime is in place as per BS7671. No portable appliances were observed in communal areas which would be subject to PAT testing. Portable electrical appliances are used in the common areas by councils own staff and approved contractors. The council has a system in place for testing its own portable appliances. Those appliances used by contractors are subject to the contractors own company's Health and Safety arrangements which are required by the council. Electric meters should be installed where applicable in accordance with current IET Wiring Regulations

There is a mains electrical intake cupboard within the ground floor lift lobby and bin store, riser cupboards within the lift lobbies at all levels and electrical cabinets within the lobbies of the alternative means of escapes which lead into staircase. The riser and laterals are contained within a metal conduit within the lift lobbies (then into suspended ceiling) and bin chute hopper rooms.

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6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL



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6.2 Gas

6.2.1 Is there gas supplied in the area of inspection? Yes No N/A

There is a gas supply that has been installed within the last 5 years, and this is seen running vertically on flank wall and onwards to flats along the soffit of escape balconies. No gas services located within the internal corridors/staircase.

6.2.2 Is gas equipment protected/located so as to prevent accidental damage? Yes No N/A

6.2.3 Are gas installations and appliances free from any obvious defects? Yes No N/A

6.2.4 Comments

There is a gas supply that has been installed within the last 5 years, and this is seen running vertically on flank wall and onwards to flats along the soffit of escape balconies. Hot water and heating is supplied by the communal boiler system within Lakanal, this installation is subject to the councils maintenance and testing regime in accordance with statutory compliance. Records of inspection and testing are held on the council's database.

No observations were made on this inspection of any gas installations which may be prone to accidental damage or have any defects.

Note: Gas services and installations pipes should not be incorporated within protected stairways unless gas installation is in accordance with the requirements for installation and connection set out in pipelines gas safety regulations and gas safety (installation and use) regulations.

6.3 Smoking

6.3.1 Is there evidence of smoking in areas where this has been prohibited? Yes No N/A

6.3.2 Comments

6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

No evidence of smoking in the internal common areas was observed at the time of inspection. Smoking in the communal areas is not permitted, however it is understood that residents may smoke within their own dwellings. No Smoking signs have been installed.

NOTE: Since 1 October 2012, at least 1 legible no-smoking sign must be displayed but landlords are now free to decide the size, design and location of the signs. No action is needed for anyone who is already complying with the current regulations. But the new smoke-free signs regulations, give landlords the freedom to move, change or remove multiple signs.

6.4 Arson

- 6.4.1 Does basic security against arson from outsiders appear to be reasonable? Yes No N/A

The building has secured access control with key and intercom system with a drop key override to the front/rear of the building.

- 6.4.2 Is there an unnecessary fire load within the building or in close proximity of the premises which is available to ignition from outsiders? Yes No N/A

- 6.4.3 Is there any shrubbery that needs pruning or removing to prevent fire spread if ignited? Yes No N/A

Trees plants and combustible materials were not found in close proximity to the building during the inspection. Any trees of vegetation overhanging the building and any combustible materials near the building should be removed.

- 6.4.4 Comments

The building has an electronic key/fob entry system to the main entrance doors, stair escape door and all corridor access doors. Both bin rooms were found locked. Fire suppression equipment has been installed within both bin room areas on the ground floor this system appears to have been shut down and no longer in use. (supply valve set to off near the tank).

Images



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6.5 Portable Heaters and Heating Installations

- 6.5.1 Does the area of inspection have any portable heaters or heating installations? Yes No N/A

No heating installation provided within the common areas. District heating services located in ceiling void of communal corridors which enter dwellings.

6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

6.6 Lightning

- 6.6.1 Does the premises have a lightning protection system? Yes No N/A

The lightning conductor system is inspected and tested annually in accordance with BS EN 62305. All records of such inspecting and testing are held centrally at Southwark Council's offices.

- 6.6.2 Comments

Lightning protection is in place at this block and was in good visual order on the day of inspection. This facility is inspected and tested by Southwark's engineering team annually in accordance with BS EN 62305. All records of such inspecting and testing are held centrally at Southwark Council's offices.

6.7 Housekeeping

- 6.7.1 Is the standard of housekeeping adequate? Yes No N/A

Although house keeping has improved significantly since last fire risk assessment, there were still some issues noted by the risk assessor.

9th floor - external balcony for maisonettes [REDACTED] - clothes along the balcony.

10th floor - accumulation of rubbish within the lobby area

4th floor - accumulation of rubbish within lobby area

Due to current risks indentified, the block will need to have 'zero tolerance' approach adopted temporarily.

There was storage of combustible materials along the external balcony of the TRA Hall, including BBQ and timber. The balcony presents a fire load that could spread vertically up.

May 2021 - The above issues has since been addressed and tasks closed. Regular checks now in place from the waking watch team, who will report any issues.

- 6.7.2 Are combustible materials separated from any sources of ignition? Yes No N/A

- 6.7.3 Comments

Good housekeeping is fundamental to reducing risk in the communal areas. Controlling the presence of combustible materials and ignition sources not only reduces the potential for accidental fires to start and develop in the common parts, it also significantly reduces the scope for deliberate fires. It also ensures escape routes are free of obstructions that might hinder the evacuation of people from the building and access for fire-fighters.

- 6.7.4 What is the housekeeping regime for the premises ZERO TOLERANCE

Due to the current risks within the block, the block will need to have 'zero tolerance' approach adopted temporarily. RSO to meet with residents to ensure an agreed approach is adopted as per Southwark policy, and ensure that there are clearly defined 'do's and don'ts that residents can easily follow.

6.8 Dangerous Substances

6 FIRE HAZARDS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

6.8.1 Are there any hazardous substances in the area of inspection? Yes No N/A

6.8.2 Are the general fire precautions adequate to address the hazards associated with dangerous substances used and stored on the premises? Yes No N/A

6.8.3 Comments

No dangerous substances noted.

6.9 Hazards Introduced by Contractors or Works

6.9.1 Are there contractors or works taking place in the area of inspection? Yes No N/A

6.9.2 Is there satisfactory control over works carried out by the on site contractors (including hot works permits)? Yes No N/A

6.9.3 Comments

No hot works were being carried out at the time of the inspection with no evidence of any hot works having been carried out was observed.

Contractors carrying out work at Southwark Council premises are pre-selected from an approved list. They must have undergone a selection and training process prior to being allowed to carry out work at council premises. All contractors should receive a permit to work. There should be no reliance on council staff to perform safety checks on hot works carried out by contractor.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

7.1 Measures to Prevent Fire Spread and Development

7.1.1 Is compartmentation suitable? Yes No N/A

Breaches in the fire compartmentation have not been fire stopped or have been fire stopped using materials and or systems that do not appear to comply with the requirements and / or recommendations of BS 476 and the ASFP colour guide books. Below are details;

Various breaches in fire compartmentation identified, including within the access hatches of the suspended ceiling;

Ground floor electrical intake room - damage to fire batt installation

Suspended ceiling by maisonette ■ - large hole in block hole

Hole to suspended ceiling by maisonette ■

11th floor - fire breaches within lift lobby suspended ceiling

3rd floor - damage to ceiling in corridor

1st floor - fire breaches within suspended ceiling

13th floor by maisonette ■ - lining to fire compartmentation loose and coming away from staircase enclosure in suspended ceiling - the standard of protection and materials used could not be confirmed by the assessor.

The access panels to the suspended ceiling had labels detailing 1 hour fire resistance, however some panels have been severely damaged by water deterioration which could impact on fire performance, other panels had 15mm fire line board installed.

Significant breaches were identified to the block which compromises the fire safety integrity and compartmentation to support 'stay put' strategy. A full passive fire survey/type 4 is required to assess the current standards of the passive fire safety installations

Bin chute hoppers - hoppers are in good working conditions. Chute hoppers should be replaced when they become defective. Fire-resisting shutter/ fusible link in place to base of refuse chutes, although x 1 shutter was in the close position. The automatic fire-resisting shutter fitted at the base of the refuse chute should be tested/maintained to ensure it can restrict the spread of fire and smoke from a fire in the bin room. The shutter should, as a minimum, be operated on a fixed temperature fusible link - No confirmation on maintenance regime.

Access doors/rodding eyes - located on stairwells, previous FRA confirm they are 60 minutes FR, however on inspection, one of the bin chutes were fully blocked.

A sprinkler system is also installed to the bin store - however it seems to be decommissioned, no further information was provided to assessor on reasons.

The metal and timber panel between the ground floor lift lobby and the upper ground stairwell did not appear to be 60 minutes fire resisting. This panel should be upgraded to a 60 minutes fire resisting construction.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

2nd floor server room, located off means of escape lobby not enclosed with 30 minutes fire resistance.

Envirgraf labels located to metal trunking serving maisonettes and through floors.

An inspection of the lift motor room could not be carried out due to ladder access.

To support the 'stay put' strategy, compartmentation is a critical aspect of this approach, the following should be constructed as compartment walls and floors with the aim to achieve 60 minutes fire resistance with every floor, every wall separating a flat from any other part of the building and every wall and floor. This building should provide concrete flooring, solid walls from the single means of escape. In regards to the flat entrance doors (FEDs), should be FD30s SC type where dead end/passing risk. Due to the issues highlighted, a 'stay put' strategy has been changed to a simultaneous evacuation (please see body of report).

NOTE: Any openings around pipes, services or ducts that pass through fire-resisting construction should be fire stopped with materials of fire stopping products which provide the appropriate fire resistance when tested to the relevant part of BS 476 or BS EN 13501 are acceptable. Any services (such as cables) constructed of combustible materials or materials likely to melt or be affected by fire should be enclosed within fire resisting construction and be fire stopped to restrict the passage of smoke and fire.

Images



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7.1.2 Is there reasonable limitation of linings that might promote fire spread? Yes No N/A

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

There is pigeon netting fitted to the front and rear facades of the building and some flats external balconies. There is no requirement for pigeon netting to be fire resistant stated in current or previous building regulations. Southwark have instigated a policy where all new and replacement pest control measures will be fire retardant on all housing stock irrespective of height. All current netting is will be assessed for performance in fire and a decision will be made shortly on how this is to be progressed.

Assessor informed redecoration of the communal corridors areas was completed during last major works, a class 0 paint system has been used. Other areas - Internal decoration of the common parts appeared to be paint onto a plastered surface; this would achieve an acceptable surface spread of flame.

NOTE: Class 0/Class B s3, d2 - These are non-combustible materials and materials of limited combustibility such as brickwork, concrete, plasterboard and plastered finishes. Acceptable in all locations including protected routes, circulation routes, escape routes and stairways. Materials are classified for combustibility and surface spread of flame by BS 476: parts 6 and 7 or under the European system by BS EN 13501-1. Walls and ceilings separating individual units of accommodation should be constructed to provide a minimum of 60 minutes fire resistance; and protected routes should be fully enclosed at all points by construction providing a minimum fire resistance has been applied.

- 7.1.3 Where ducting is provided can it be ascertained if fire dampers are provided to prevent the spread of fire through compartments to protect the means of escape? Yes No N/A

No ventilation ducts were identified in communal areas. It has been confirmed to this assessor that the only ventilation system within the block is the bathroom & kitchen extract system/entrance hallway ventilation panel commented on below.

Bathroom Extract System: The original bathroom extract system was of a shunt duct design. Within the Lakanal enquiry findings and coroners report it was found that smoke passed through this ducting into the bathrooms of other flats above the flat with the fire. It is with this in mind and to prevent any potential future problems with this extract system, that the shunt duct system should be surveyed and possibly decommissioned and replaced with extract ventilation to the bathroom & kitchen through ducting out to an external wall within each flat. Previous FRA state the ductwork was cleaned and serviced in November 2012 and is now due for a further clean and inspection and should be placed on a programmed maintenance and cleaning schedule. It also stated - must be noted that this ducting has no fire dampers incorporated and not all areas could be cleaned due to limited access points. Possible mitigating solution for the short term and of reducing the potential for fire spread between flats would be to fit intumescent fire dampers to the vents into the ducts. Although this would not restrict the spread of smoke in the early stages of a fire, it would prevent spread of flames and hot gases.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

The assessor also noted ventilation grilles within the entrance lobby of maisonette ■ and vent located to top of internal stairs. A full survey investigation into the communal ventilation system is required. As well as determining the type of systems installed, develop an engineered solution to eliminate any potential risk of smoke transfer between maisonettes.

The maisonettes fall outside the scope of this FRA, however any future type 4 surveys/passive surveys should include sample inspections of maisonettes.

The rubbish chutes within the building are located on all odd numbered floor levels within protected & ventilated chute rooms, the present chute doors are 1.5 hr fire rated chute doors with smoke seals to BS 7386. Please refer to section 7.1.1.

Update November 2020: Ductclean has since informed intumescent vents have been installed to bathroom/toilets apart from x 14 dwellings - This ongoing.
They are not aware of the vents located in some dwellings entrance hallway which requires attention.

May 2021 - A survey of the grilles within some dwellings has been completed, no significant issues in regards to risk of fire/smoke spread was reported.

Images



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7.1.4 Comments

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

Compartmentation: It is considered that the concrete slab and brick /block construction will provide the required fire separation. However this form of construction is subject to general building conditions of age, and incorrectly installed/maintained services/works that can lead to smoke or fire spread. For this standard of construction we deem this risk to be high and have recommended a compartmentation solution to meet that risk (type 4/passive fire survey). These risks must be continually monitored. The common parts internal walls highlighted breaches in compartmentation. It was not possible to ascertain the construction of compartment walls and floors within the individual flats (there has since been intrusive void surveys completed). It should be noted that the weakness in compartmentation between the corridor & maisonettes scissor stair configuration, identified by the Lakanal enquiry, was informed to have been addressed by the installation of a 60 minute fire resisting construction in this area, however some fire breaches have been identified by the assessor. The false ceiling within the access corridors at all odd numbered levels has been protected using 60 minute fire resisting (FR) construction, cavity barriers every 5m along its length and fitted with 60 minute FR inspection hatches - However assessor has identified some issues which are highlighted in this report.

VOIDS: The individual flats heating and hot water is provided by communal boilers within Lakanal House & service vents/ducts were provided in the building. Any internal service ducting should be inspected to confirm fire stopping between compartments at any void - type 4 survey and full passive/compartmentation survey required.

Surface spread of flame: Internal decoration of the common parts appeared to be paint onto a plastered surface; this would achieve an acceptable surface spread of flame. Strip old paint before future redecoration. The false ceiling within all corridors has a class 0 surface spread of flame.

The bathroom extract system has shunt ducting and is compliant with ADB (minimum of 900mm rise before joining the common stack, 1500mm provided). The ductwork was cleaned and serviced in December 2020 and should be placed on a programmed maintenance and cleaning schedule. It must be noted that this ducting has no fire dampers incorporated and not all areas could be cleaned due to limited access points. Within the Lakanal enquiry findings and coroners report it was found that smoke passed through this ducting into other flats bathrooms above the fire flat. It is with this in mind & to mitigate any potential future problems with this extract system. It is recommended that a smoke test is undertaken on this system at any future void, this will allow the council to evidence that this system is working efficiently within this block. If the outcome of any smoke test was found to be unsatisfactory then consideration must be given to venting all bathrooms to an exterior wall within the flats. Intumescent vents have been installed to most flats.

Access to the roof areas was not gained; LB Southwark has an ongoing programme of roof inspections.

No internal inspection of dampers/ducts and concealed spaces within the dwelling themselves has been undertaken as part of this assessment. It is recommended that these areas are periodically inspected and upgraded where required to ensure adequate fire protection and compartmentation throughout the property. Ensure that there is adequate provision to prevent the spread of fire and smoke between ducts and concealed spaces.

The rubbish chutes within the building are located on all odd numbered floor levels within protected & ventilated chute rooms, fusible link fire shutters to base and sprinkler system (decommissioned).

No previous documentation or information was provided to the assessor at time of assessment on previous passive fire safety works/ materials used/ fire strategy documentation.

7.2 Means of Escape from Fire

7.2.1 Are there adequate provisions for exits in the area assessed? Yes No N/A

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

The fire escape door between the open balcony escapes and the stair lobbies to the maisonette upper levels at the 12th floor serving flats [REDACTED] (rear of the building) and the 2nd floor serving flats [REDACTED] (rear of the building). These doors must be eased and adjusted to allow them to open freely, assessor could not open when checked, possible lock failure. Urgent defect.

Some push pads in general were stiff, these should be replaced during next major works to ensure easy openable mechanism for residents to use in event of fire. It is advised these exit doors on external balconies are addressed at next major works, along with improved fire signage.

- 7.2.2 Are exits immediately openable where necessary? Yes No N/A
- 7.2.3 Are the means for securing the exit doors appropriate? Yes No N/A
- 7.2.4 Is there suitable protection for the escape routes? This is to include any glazing. Yes No N/A

To the external balcony means of escape, there are installed UPVC panels at full length. It could not be confirmed if these panels would achieve 60 minutes fire resistance. Glazing along these balconies are above 1.1m.

- 7.2.5 Are there any inner room scenarios? Yes No N/A
- 7.2.6 Are the escape routes free from obstructions or electrical/telecom installations likely to give rise to an obstruction in the event of a fire? Yes No N/A
- 7.2.7 Do any doors have additional security grilles or gates fitted over the means of escape that will hamper an individual in the event of a fire? Yes No N/A
- 7.2.8 Where final exit doors are fitted with electrical overrides to open will this door open in the event of an electrical failure? Yes No N/A

The final exit door from the escape stair has an electronic security system installed with a push button to open internally, a green emergency override button fitted and a drop key override external. It is LBS council's policy to ensure that the electronic front entry door locks fail safe open in the event of any power failure.

NOTE: Protruding 'Mushroom' type release buttons can be operated with an elbow, forearm, palm of the hand, knee, hip etc. and are far easier to operate than the flush mounted type buttons which require a finger or thumb to be applied with a degree of accuracy.

May 2021 - The final exits have now been interfaced with the temporary communal fire alarm system.

- 7.2.9 Do the travel distances in the common areas comply with those escape distances specified in current/previous building regulations? Yes No N/A

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

Means of escape for the block: Current building regulation guidance states that where a building contains flats which are designed with an internal alternative Means of Escape (MOE) at different levels, provision is made for extended travel distances for those means of escape. It must be assumed that the standard applicable at the time of this buildings construction (1959) made the same allowances (The London Building Act 1939 & LCC code of practice (MOE). There is one protected corridor and two open balcony escapes serving maisonettes within the block, all lead into the central single escape stair. Communal corridors are approx 27m in length, in ventilated lobbies and corridors, travel distances over 15m are likely to be unusual, and cannot be considered acceptable without additional measures, which might include 'replacement FD30S' doors, AOVs or automatic fire detection. Also please refer to the smoke section of this report.

LBS approach was to replace the fire doors/FEDs and installed LD2 system within maisonettes (approx 2010-2012).

AOV upgrade should be considered during next major works via a LBS feasibility study as so should potential retrofit of sprinklers, taking into account guidance at the time. This should form part of a risk analyst approach on the overall holistic risk of the block and provide a proportionate to the risk approach to establish best safety solutions for residents.

7.2.10 Comments

The building is approximately 45m (16 floors) from the ground to the to (habitable) upper floor surface in height, 65m in length and 15m wide giving a square footprint of 975m².

Due to various issues highlighted within this report, an assessment of the current 'stay put' strategy has been reviewed after additional information was collated and liaising with local fire authorities. The strategy for the is currently simultaneous evacuation via temporary communal fire alarm system installed with waking watch staff acting on evacuation management.

Individual maisonette entrance doors all open inwards against the direction of escape. However, this is acceptable due to the nature of the premises and the low evacuation requirements.

Means of escape for the maisonettes:

Lower level: The bedrooms at the lower level have access to the main FED and a further escape door from the main bedroom into the protected corridor (note there is an escape door from the smaller bedroom into the main bedroom via a passing hatch). Escape from the flats FEDs lead through the protected corridor into the lift lobby then into the protected stair. The extended travel distance within the corridors are approximately 27m. Original design concept was to have x 2 means of escape from every room.

Upper levels: Maisonettes have access to two shared escape balconies from their upper level, one to the front and one to the rear elevations. The upper floor escape balconies exit through fire doors fitted with push pads into a protected lobby then into the staircase. Means of escape ground floor common area: The ground floor lift lobby has escape through the main entrance only. An inspection of the maisonettes was carried out and residents appeared to understand the escape strategy for their dwellings. Detailed fire safety information packs have been prepared by the fire safety team in which the RSO provides for residents, ensure this is regularly done and reviewed.

7.3 Emergency Escape Lighting

7.3.1 Is Emergency Lighting provided and if so is there full compliance? Yes No N/A

7.3.2 Comments

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

A reasonable standard of emergency escape lighting system is provided with fittings on stairs and access balconies (Based on visual inspection, but no test of illuminance levels or verification of full compliance with relevant British Standards carried out). Any future major works should consider extension of emergency lighting as per BS5266 Part 1 where applicable.

Where installed, emergency lighting should be subject to monthly and annual testing and inspection (monthly flick testing and an annual 3 hour drain down) in accordance with BS 5266: Part 8 (BS EN 50172). Records kept within Southwark database.

Note: The correct maintenance of emergency lighting in residential buildings is extremely important because the residents may be required to evacuate the building during the hours of darkness in a confused and distressed state. In most cases self-contained, non-maintained luminaires providing three hour duration will be adequate. Non-maintained luminaires remain unlit when the conventional lighting power supply is healthy. When it fails, the luminaire provides power to its own lamp from its own battery and illuminates. Restoration of the conventional lighting power supply switches off the emergency luminaire and recharges its battery.

7.4 Fire Safety Signs and Notices

7.4.1 Is there reasonable provision for all notices? Yes No N/A

Exit route signage was found missing in the following locations and must be replaced within the stair case 14th floor down to the security door at 13th floor level. Supply and fit an 3A sign at the bottom of the stair at 13th floor pointing towards the door.

7.4.2 Is there suitable signage for automatic, self closing and locked fire doors? Yes No N/A

The following signage is required to the fire doors. Fire door keep shut to both sides of all fire exit doors including all balcony exits, stair and chute lobby doors (2x signs per door 2x doors /floor (1st-14th floors) 28 doors 56 signs in total).

Fire door keep locked shut on all electrical intake doors (2x total) - Outstanding task - APEX-HSI-1039696

Turn to open signage on the metal security door leading from the 14th floor into the 13th floor landing

7.4.3 Is the fire action notice fitted in the correct area and displaying the correct information? Yes No N/A

May 2021 - Temporary Fire Action Notices have ben displayed to reflect the change in evacuation strategy to a simultaneous evacuation.

7.4.4 Are the 'No Smoking' signs fitted and are there sufficient notices? Yes No N/A

7.4.5 Have 'areas of special risks' such as boiler rooms, oil transformer rooms, switchgear rooms and telecommunication rooms been appropriately signed? Yes No N/A

7.4.6 Comments

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

Directional fire exit signage installed at various locations.. All escape, FAN, NO SMOKING, LIFT, and door signage has been installed, any issues has been highlighted within task actions of this report.

Where fire safety signs are provided they should be in accordance with BS ISO 3864-1 (old BS5499-1) BS EN ISO7010 (BS5499 Part 4 and 10 still active) and the Health and Safety (Safety Signs and Signals) Regulations 1996.

Images



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7.5 Means of Giving Warning in Case of Fire

- 7.5.1 Does the common area of the building have an automatic detection and warning fire alarm system? Yes No N/A

A smoke detection system was installed and understood to be linked into a sprinkler suppression system to the ground floor bin rooms and store room. Controls were located within the electrical intake within one of these bin rooms, shut off valve within the rear bin room. This system seem to be live still.

May 2021 - The common fire alarm system has been designed in accordance with the recommendations of BS 5839-1 for a Category L5 system, except that the sound pressure level of the fire alarm signal within flats need only be 85dB(A) at the open doorways of every bedroom in each flat. Any fire detection and fire alarm system should be designed, installed and commissioned by an appropriately qualified, third-party accredited competent persons - LBS awaiting documentation due to system going live only recently. The system is also linked to a alarm receiving centre (ARC). Waking watch check the panel for faults during patrols and the required testing and maintenance programme will be set up with weekly tests every Wednesday at 09.00am.

- 7.5.2 Is the extent of the detection fitted appropriate for the occupancy and fire risk? Yes No N/A

D1 LD1 system has been installed to dwelling, design and commissioning certificates have been sent to LBS.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

- 7.5.3 Is there the remote transmission of alarm signals to an Alarm Receiving Centre in place? Yes No N/A

ARC system interfaced with communal fire alarm system as is the lifts and final exits.

- 7.5.4 Comments

In Line with normal practice for purpose built and converted residential blocks designed to facilitate a 'defend in place' evacuation strategy there is no need for communal automatic fire detection and alarm system to be fitted in the building. Such a system is not normally required for purpose built residential blocks and is not required under the Building Regulations 2010, other than to activate any automatic opening vents.

May 2021 - LB Southwark are undergoing a major program of works to ensure all flats are fitted with smoke detection, the design of this system is in accordance with BS 5839 (2019) part 6 LD2 Grade D1. All bar one dwelling have had this enhanced system installed, design and commissioning certificates have been provided to LBS.

The communal areas have a BS 5839-1, Category L5 system, except that the sound pressure level of the fire alarm signal within flats need only be 85dB(A) at the open doorways of every bedroom in each flat, heat detection extended into each dwelling. Heat detection also included in plant rooms area. Full specification and design agreed with LBS and fire alarm engineers. System underwent a soak test and commissioning test was completed on 7th May 2021. Design, installation and commissioning certificates to be presented to LBS. Main fire alarm indicator panel located on ground floor entrance for lifts with zonal plans next to panel. Required testing and maintenance regime to BS5839 Part 1 set up and first weekly functional test completed on 12/05/2021. Fire log book located within the panel cabinet. The system is interfaced with the lifts, final exits and linked to remote monitoring centre who will summon the fire rescue service in event of fire incident.

7.6 Smoke Ventilation Requirements

- 7.6.1 Is it considered that the premises has been provided with reasonable means of smoke ventilation in the event of a fire? Yes No N/A

It is not normal practice to retrospectively apply current guidance relating to the design of new buildings, to existing buildings except when the original design principles are far removed from those accepted today. It is reasonable to consider developments in fire safety technology and best practice that could reasonably be applied to an existing building. The assessor has therefore considered such developments to the ventilation strategy.

Ventilation: The original ventilation strategy for the flat access levels is smoke dispersal, which allowed ventilation of each floor through both corridor end walls and the lift lobby (cross flow). Ventilation was achieved through full height vents to the end walls, large double height vented areas in the lift lobby areas and vents set within the cross corridor security access doors. This ventilation strategy is as per the original design specifications & considered sufficient to support extended travel distances. However, recent research has shown this system of smoke dispersal (in extenuating circumstances) can have some drawbacks. It has been shown that the design of Permanently Open Vents (PV) in a building of this type may allow for smoke to be dispersed from one floor and enter another floor (or floors), depending on weather conditions. During the next refurbishment of the block, serious consideration will be given to changing the blocks ventilation strategy from smoke dispersal to smoke containment in line with current best practice. This can be achieved by retaining the current end wall vents and the security doors located in the corridors being replaced with FD60s SC fire resisting door sets.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

This approach was adopted at the sister block of Lakanal House and agreed with building control. Another solution is this can be achieved by the end wall vents are changed to manually openable vents & FD30s SC fire door sets & screens being installed as smoke check doors to replace the current security doors.

As stated the original smoke strategy was in line with design guidance at time of construction (LCC Means of Escape in Case of Fire 1954), however introduction of security doors has impacted on required free area required for smoke dispersal, although they do have mesh wire panels which provide a certain level of cross ventilation

Consideration should also be given to the installation of Automatic Opening Vents (AOV's) to prevent smoke from lower levels spreading to other levels within the block. A cost risk analysis report should be completed prior to next major works programme.

A full smoke strategy survey is recommended to be completed via a cost risk analyst by a competent contractor for LBS to consider during next major works.
In blocks of flats designed with corridor smoke dispersal systems, consideration should be given to providing cross-corridor doors to change to a smoke containment approach, but maintain the OVs or PVs to ventilate the sections of corridor remaining. Advice from a specialist should be sought and assess the holistic risk in current proposal to change from cross ventilation to smoke containment via the lobby fire doors only or if AOVs are required and proportionate to the risks presented.

There is no natural ventilation within the bin stores located on ground floor.

- 7.6.2 Is the building ventilated naturally? Yes No N/A
- 7.6.3 If permanently ventilated in the common area is there sufficient free area? Yes No N/A
- 7.6.4 If permanently ventilated in the stair is there sufficient free area? Yes No N/A

The stair is ventilated at the head of the stairwell by the removal of one of the doors leading to the external balcony lobby giving more than 1 square meter.

The stairwell was found to have a large PV at the base of the stair (upper ground level) near the T&RA hall entrance and additional ventilation holes within the final exit door. This may allow smoke from any fire within the T&RA hall into the stairwell and the current best practice recommends that there is no ventilation provided at the base of the stair to improve the draw. Cover the open areas within the upper ground stairwell (near the T&RA entrance door) and cover the holes within the final exit door from the stairwell at upper ground level to remove the PV to this area.

- 7.6.5 Are vents/openings obstructed in any location where they are required? Yes No N/A
- 7.6.6 Is the building ventilated naturally by AOV's, shutters or doors? Yes No N/A
- 7.6.7 Are detectors that operate AOV's, shutters and vents silent operating? Yes No N/A
- 7.6.8 Is the building ventilated by a mechanical smoke extraction system? Yes No N/A
- 7.6.9 Comments

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

Ventilation: Ventilation to the stairwell is via permanent vents at the 14th floor (2 X 1.2m X 850mm). Ventilation to the double height lift lobby areas are via permanently open vents at all levels. The escape balconies are open to air. The protected corridors have a through ventilation strategy allowing ventilation of each complete floor through both corridors & the lift lobby. This is attained through full height vents to the end wall (1.3m X 2m approx) & large vents within the cross corridor security access doors (600mm X 1m).

Escape from the flats FEDs lead through the protected corridor into the lift lobby then into the protected stair. The extended travel distance within the corridors are approximately 30m, this extended travel is supported with a cross corridor ventilation system as per the original specification. The current ventilation strategy is slightly restricted due to the addition of the security doors to the corridor although they have large vents installed this would not match the surface area of the end wall vents. The protected corridors have cross-flow ventilation, this is a smoke dispersal strategy which allows ventilation of each access floor through both corridor ends & the lift lobby.

Ventilation is achieved through full height vents to the end wall, large double height vented areas in the lift lobby and vents set within the cross corridor security access doors. This ventilation strategy is as per the original design specifications & was originally considered sufficient to support extended travel distances. However, recent research has shown this system of smoke dispersal (in extenuating circumstances) can have some drawbacks. It has been shown that the design of Permanently Open Vents (PV) in a building of this type may allow for smoke to be dispersed from one floor and enter another floor (or floors), depending on weather conditions.

It must be remembered that all maisonettes have an alternative MOE at upper floors leading along open balconies and into a protected stair.

Images



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7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES



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7.7 Fire Brigade Access and Facilities

- 7.7.1 Is there suitable access for fire appliances with adequate provision for a turning circle, hammerhead or other point a vehicle can turn if required? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.2 Are there any obstructions in the form of a gate, bollards or removable posts that may hinder appliance access? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.3 Is the building fitted with either a wet or dry rising main? Yes No N/A

Inlet located by main entrance to lift lobby, ground floor. Dry riser outlets located within the lift lobby areas (however not on all floors).

The dry rising mains should be subject to a 6 monthly visual inspection and an annual pressure test in accordance with BS 9990, records held at Southwark office.

- 7.7.4 Is the hose distance to the riser or dwelling acceptable? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.5 Does the front entry door have a firefighter's override? Yes No N/A

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

The emergency services drop key overrides are defective to the following doors, 13th floor serving the corridor to flats [REDACTED] 9th floor serving flats, 7th floor serving the corridor to flats [REDACTED]

- 7.7.6 Is the current access provision suitable and sufficient for firefighters? Is there an inappropriate level of security before entry is made into an affected dwelling by Firefighters? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.7 Where locked do all firefighting facilities have FB locks? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.8 Are firefighting lifts installed? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.9 Do the lifts in the area inspected have firefighting overrides? Yes No N/A

Lift has a fireman's switch. This consists of a switch (at ground floor level) that can be operated by the fire service to give them some additional control over one or more of the lifts. The most common effect is to over-ride all floor calling, to return the lift to the floor where the Fireman's switch is, then to open the doors and the doors remain open. Control of the lift is purely through the lift cars buttons and pressure must remain on the button during operation. Periodic testing should take place.

- 7.7.10 Where fitted are all wet/dry riser outlets and inlets accessible? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.11 Is there suitable signage for firefighting facilities that would allow for effective use during firefighting operations? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.12 Where panels are fitted for smoke ventilation and fire alarm systems-have zonal charts been sited in a prominent position which have easy to follow instructions and are accurate? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.13 Does the building signage give correct directions to dwellings in an emergency? Yes No N/A
- 7.7.14 Where fitted does the Premises Information Box contain the correct and relevant information? Yes No N/A

Currently no premises information box installed by entrance like it sister block, Lakanal House.

- 7.7.15 Comments

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

There are drop key overrides to the main and rear entrance door, lift overrides & all corridors at all levels. Fire appliance access is provided to the front of the block. There is a drop key override control to the lifts but these lifts were not considered fire fighting lifts with separate power sources and water diverters. Recommend a premises information box is provided to the wall next to the entrance door with a set of plans of the building including location of services & shut off controls, sprinkler suppression controls & the maisonette layout, a set of master keys and access fobs to prevent forced entry, contact details of council departments that could help during a major fire.

The dry riser serves all odd numbered floors (starting at 3rd floor level) and is within test date. There are no dry rising main outlets on the 1st or even numbered floors to this building and while there is no obligation to retro-fit these outlets it should be considered during any future major refurbishment works planned for this building. It is LBS FST policy to inform LFB of any block over 18m and without a fully installed dry rising main as part of its consultation process.

This risk is mitigated by the ease of access to the front of the block for fire appliances and a partially installed dry rising main with outlets at all odd numbered floors starting at the 3rd floor. It is considered that as the even numbered floors within this building have no access to the flats FEDs that no outlets will be required at these levels, and therefore consideration will be given to installing a dry riser outlet within the 1st floor lift lobby only. LFB were informed in 2016.

May 2021 - LFB updated on change in evacuation strategy and have been provided copies of PEEPS and internal procedures, AFD system interfaced with final exits, lifts ground and link with ARC who will summon the fire rescue service.

Images



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7.8 Fire Doors

- 7.8.1 Are all dwelling front entry doors and hardware (where required) compliant with certification carried out to BS476-22/BSEN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value? (Consider seals and strips) Yes No N/A

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

All FEDs and escape doors into the protected corridors were multi-lock 30 minute fire doors (FD30s SC) fitted some 9-10 years ago, following an sample inspection they were found to be fitted with intumescent strips, smoke seals & a single Perkomatic self closing device, single Perkomatics are not considered to meet the standard required and should be replaced by door closers to BS EN 1154. (action within the SC section.) No manufacturers instructions or fire door certificates were provided to assessor at time of assessment. Some of the alternative exit doors have gaps exceeding 3mm. Fanlights extend into ceiling voids. No visual identification was noted on the door leaf (no labels or plugs as per BM Trada/BWF)

It is also recommended that the escape doors (next to the FEDs) have the thumb turn deadlock replaced with a latch that secures shut when the door closes.

NOTE: Installation of new fire door sets should be via 3rd party accredited installers in line with the manufacturer's instructions and the fire door certificate (CF or CAF) for specific installation instructions.


For further guidance on fire doors -

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/859279/A_Assurance_and_Assessment_of_Fire_Doors_-_January_2020.pdf


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7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES



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- 7.8.2 Are all cross corridor, stair and lobby doors certified to a test regime under BS476-22 or BS EN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value? Yes No N/A

Below are the following issues identified with communal fire doors;

9th floor - fire door not closing into frame to staircase
11th floor - fire door to lift lobby missing intumescent smoke seals/ fire door to bin chute room not closing fully into frame
13th floor - fire door to bin chute room, intumescent strips missing
1st floor - fire door to staircase, gaps around the door frame/substrate
4th floor - fire door to bin chute room not closing fully into frame

The stair doors have excessive gaps (door/frame) and require rehanging to provide a maximum of 4mm gap or replaced where they were found warped in the frame.

NOTE: Where doorsets have parts that need replacing, care should be taken to ensure replacements are of the same specification used in the original design as evidenced in the manufacturer's test evidence/certification and documentation for the doorset and that the doorset itself has not been altered in any way. Where the manufacturer or supplier is unknown, then an assessment can be carried out by a competent expert. All assessments and repairs should be carried out in line with the manufacturer's instructions by a suitably qualified person or organisation that can demonstrate the appropriate levels of skill and competency. Certification under a UKAS accredited door installer scheme would be a way of establishing those criteria.

For further guidance on fire doors -

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/859279/A_Assurance_and_Assessment_of_Fire_Doors_-_January_2020.pdf

Update November 2020 - Contractor Ventro have completed a survey of the block, surveying the communal fire doors.

- 7.8.3 Are all electrical intake/boiler/utility service room doors suitably fire resistant as tested under the BS476-22 or BS EN 1634-1 regime or of a suitable notional value? Yes No N/A

There are breaks in the linear gaps of door frame/ wall to ground floor electrical intake - rock wool in place but no mastic application.

NOTE: The gap filling materials and methods must be the correct materials and processes are used in accordance with the fire rating of the door that is installed. Suitable Certifire approved linear gap sealing systems may also be utilised to protect the frame / supporting construction gap, subject to the conditions contained within the relevant certificate. Mastic - Mastic may only be used if it is a compatible, approved linear gap joint seal, successfully tested in accordance with BS 476-20 or BS EN 1366-4 for the required period of fire resistance. Always check the fire certificate of backfilling materials for compatibility and limitations that will affect performance.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

Images



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- 7.8.4 Are all ancillary doors (in escape routes) suitably fire resistant as tested against BS476-22/BS EN 1634-1 or of suitable notional value? Yes No N/A

The alternative means of escape fire doors onto balcony exit routes should be notional 30 minutes fire resistance, no inspection was possible during this type 1 fire risk assessment. These doors should be inspected as part of the full fire door survey for the block.

- 7.8.5 Are all doors leading to rubbish areas or bin chutes where they are in the escape routes suitably tested to BS476-22/BS EN 1634-1 regime or of a suitable notional value? Yes No N/A

- 7.8.6 Do all fire doors have self closing devices compliant with BS EN 1154? Where not applicable are fire doors kept locked shut? Yes No N/A

All FEDs and flat escape doors into the protected corridors were multi-lock 30 minute fire doors (FD30s SC) fitted some 9-10 years ago, following an sample inspection they were found to be fitted with intumescent strips, smoke seals & a single Perkomatic self closing device, single Perkos are not considered to meet the standard required and should be replaced by door closers to BS EN 1154.

Note: The flat entrance doors are critical to the safety of the common parts in the event of a fire within a flat. The doors must be self-closing and afford an adequate degree of fire resistance. FEDs should be fitted with suitable positive action self-closing devices. The self-closing device should be capable of closing the door in its frame from any angle and overcoming the resistance of any latch.

Images



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- 7.8.7 Are any fire doors surveyed at this site constructed of anything else other than wood? Yes No N/A

Electrical intake (within bin room) and access door from 13th floor within the stair were metal.

- 7.8.8 Do doors on the means of escape open in the direction of escape where necessary? Yes No N/A

- 7.8.9 Are doors on the means of escape fitted with appropriate panic bolts or latches where required? Yes No N/A

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

The push pad was found defective on the open balcony escape door serving flats [REDACTED] on the 14th floor. Action within 7.2. Some of the signs are fading.

7.8.10 Where applicable are doors appropriate for use by disabled individuals? Yes No N/A

7.8.11 Where applicable does the door have a vision panel fitted? Yes No N/A

7.8.12 Comments

All FEDs and escape doors into the protected corridors were multi-lock 30 minute fire doors (FD30s SC) fitted some 9-10 years ago, following an sample inspection they were found to be fitted with intumescent strips, smoke seals & a single Perkomatic self closing device, single Perkos are not considered to meet the standard required and should be replaced by door closers to BS EN 1154. Corridor security doors are considered not to be fire resisting the adequacy of these doors are discussed within the ventilation section.

The exit door and screen from the community rooms at upper ground floor level is a notional FD60 fire resisting door set. The stair doors have excessive gaps (door/frame) and require rehanging to provide a maximum of 4mm gap or replaced where they were found warped in the frame. A report was generated by Keiron Carroll (senior fire safety surveyor) in 2016 see this report for full details. The doors to the electrical intake within the ground floor lift lobby was a substantial timber door (Notional FD 60s) and the intake door within the bin room was not considered to be fire resisting but as this door is not on an escape route this is considered acceptable. Within all corridors on odd numbered floors there were suspended ceilings with 1hr fire rated service hatches.

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

There are store rooms at all even numbered floor levels to one side of the stairwell only. The doors to these store rooms were considered in a poor condition and a notional 30 minutes fire resistance but all were found locked. These stores must be emptied and the doors locked/screwed shut and should no longer be used for storage. The only exception is the store room at 2nd floor level which contains some communication equipment which should be kept locked shut to prevent this area accumulating storage/rubbish (all found locked shut on inspection).

A programme of FED inspection as per BS8214 is recommended by competent persons and is part of future Southwark work programmes via a risk base approach and/or prior next major works programme.

Any new or replacement doors within an existing block of flats should meet current standards for fire-resisting doors (BS 476-22/31 or BS EN 1634 parts 1, 2 and 3). Similarly, any letterboxes that are fitted should be of a protected type, eg lined with intumescent material to seal the opening when exposed to fire. Installation of new fire door sets should be via 3rd party accredited installers in line with the manufacturer's instructions and the fire door certificate (CF or CAF) for specific installation instructions. It may also be appropriate to consider the upgrading or replacement of doors at the time of any major refurbishment work. A survey on all the front doors should be planned for the future as part of Southwark planned works, possibly in between leases by competent persons to ensure self closers/ double Perko chain closers are in place and to good standard,

Where doorsets have parts that need replacing, care should be taken to ensure replacements are of the same specification used in the original design as evidenced in the manufacturer's test evidence/certification and documentation for the doorset and that the doorset itself has not been altered in any way. Where the manufacturer or supplier is unknown, then an assessment can be carried out by a competent expert. All assessments and repairs should be carried out in line with the manufacturer's instructions by a suitably qualified person or organisation that can demonstrate the appropriate levels of skill and competency. Certification under a UKAS accredited door installer scheme¹⁰ would be a way of establishing those criteria.

LBS should also communicate with residents to ensure that they are aware of the importance of maintaining and not interfering with the operation of the self-closing devices on their flat entrance fire doors. Residents should also be told that fire doors must not be altered as that can reduce their fire resistance.

7.9 External Wall Finish

-
- | | | | | |
|-------|--|---|--|------------------------------|
| 7.9.1 | Is this building over 18 metres in height? | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.9.2 | Does this building have an external cladding system which overlays the original structure? | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7.9.3 | Does the building's exterior wall contain infill panels? | Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> | N/A <input type="checkbox"/> |

7 FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

The exterior of this block is approximately 50% covered with infill panels. It is understood that these panels have some Phenolic materials within its construction and do not meet the current standards required within ADB. In addition to the panel inspection, it is recommended LBS must carry out a fire test on one of these panels to confirm its combustibility and surface spread of flame rating. Then replace panels as required.

Very little information was provided to the assessor at time of this assessment.

The panel inspection was completed on 29th March 2019 - report can be sourced via the FST folders, the report confirmed the current build up fails building regulations compliance. The assessor was also provided email communications from 2012.

The spandrel panel inspection identified a 4 layer panel of aluminium, chipboard, phenolic rigid foam, aluminium. The 2012 email describe build up a aluminium, cement practical boards, phenolic rigid foam, aluminium - It is understood to achieve compliance, this went via 'desktop study exercise' which was accepted by building control for compliance. The approach for assessing spandrel panels should follow the same principals as ACM cladding.

Going on the panel inspection data - It is unlikely that any combination of ACM panels and rigid polymeric foam insulation would pass the BS 8414 test, although fire tests would confirm this (also please refer to data from the MHCLG fire tests in 2017 (fire test 7). This combination of materials could potentially present a notable fire hazard on residential buildings over 18m. It is also necessary to consider the risk from fire spread of these wall systems to health and safety in relation to a residential building of any height. A fire test is advised and urgent professional advice on the measure(s) that need to be taken to ensure that the external walls meet an appropriate standard of fire safety. This may involve the replacement of some or all of the materials in the external wall. As part of the development of these measures, assess whether cavity barriers and fire stopping have been installed correctly, and whether the system has been maintained appropriately. Consider whether short-term interim safety measures are required. Carry out any remedial works required and update this fire risk assessment following the works.

NOTE: Email have been sent to relevant LBS staff ahead of this report being completed for their attention.

The assessor did request copies of all relevant data sheets on materials used for the external facade, however no information was provided.

7.9.4 Comments

All buildings at the time of construction and/or alteration the external walls would have complied with the building regulations at the time. Southwark Council has an assessment process in place that will ensure the external fabric of a block is compliant to the current building regulations. This assessment not only includes the external finish of the wall but the materials used for insulation and fire breaks and how these materials are fixed to the building.

All panels are being examined as part of a process. This includes any that form part of the external fascia and those on escape routes with a single direction of escape. Where found to be deficient or the fire rating cannot be ascertained they will be replaced as part of the Major Works programme.

The building is constructed of a reinforced structural concrete frame, floor and roof slabs with structural concrete main cross walls, (intermediate cross walls are masonry). The external envelope of the building comprises the two main facades which are of brick & block with composite (Phenolic) infill panels UPVC windows to odd numbered floors (accommodation entrance level). The escape balconies located at each even numbered level are constructed of concrete floor, a metal balustrade and infill panels to one side and brick/block construction. Panel inspection carried out in March 2019, confirmed panel system fails compliance with building regulations.

8 MANAGEMENT OF FIRE SAFETY

8.1 Procedures and Arrangements

- 8.1.1 Are procedures in the event of fire appropriate and properly documented? Yes No N/A

Assessor informed all residents receive copy of fire safety information packs, RSO must visit new resident within the first 6 weeks. Some residents may not have english as a first language, ensure this issue is managed where applicable. Fire safety information packs were produced by the fire safety team (FST) and provide detailed information, this document should be reviewed periodically.

RSO/communal repairs officer conduct regular site visits and complete site safety checks, this information should be communicated with the FST team prior to site visits.

It is recommended that a specific check sheet for each building is developed which details fire safety items specific to each block, such as fire resistant glazing, condition of fire doors, emergency lights, ventilation etc. It may also be necessary to provide some basic fire training to the housing officers so that they are aware of what they should be looking out for when they carry out these inspections. In addition to the physical checks, there also needs to be sufficient procedures in place to ensure that where fire safety deficiencies are identified, they can be dealt with promptly. These reports should be communicated with the Fire Safety (FST) at Southwark.

Assesor informed that at tenancy start the tenants are provided with the following fire safety advice in their Tenants Information Pack:

- o London Fire Brigade Home fire safety guide (F6202)
- o London Fire Brigade Smoke alarms
- o LFB Home Fire Safety Visit - Referral Form for Vulnerable New Tenant

NOTE: May 2021 - Updated fire safety information packs distributed to residents as part of resident engagement. PEEPS have been completed and internal procedures established with the current waking watch team (evacuation management).

- 8.1.2 Have staff and relevant individuals been given appropriate fire safety training? Yes No N/A

No fire training records/information was supplied to assessor at time of assessment to clarify competence of persons involvement relating to fire safety at the block. This would include the RSO, staff leading on required works including maintenance, refurbishment of any part of the block. All contractors used should be 3rd party accredited with FST input during key stages of any future works with appropriate sign off checking the quality of fire safety works/collation of relevant fire safety information through appropriate LBS procedures and processes.

From information available on the Intranet pages council staff receive fire safety training. It is understood that local managers carry out a training needs analysis for their staff on the health and safety competency requirements, although no further information provided to assessor on this approach.

Health and Safety training programme includes:

(1) Fire safety is part of the new starter e-learning training pack, which is required for all staff to be completed within the first three weeks of start of employment.

(2) Emergencies and Fire Safety - mandatory training course providing a brief overview of the Council's general emergency procedures with details on who to contact for specific arrangements for the buildings staff are based in. Staff to have a general understanding of the basic emergency arrangements and where to find additional building specific information.

- 8.1.3 Are checks carried out by staff on fire safety systems where appropriate and logged? Yes No N/A

8 MANAGEMENT OF FIRE SAFETY

Checks/testing and maintenance carried out by relevant departments, records stored on Southwark database (not seen by assessor at time of assessment).

May 2021 - Required testing and maintenance regime to be established with the new communal fire alarm system in line with relevant British Standard (BS5839 Part 1).

Waking watch conduct regular patrols of the block and report back any fire safety issues identified.

Southwark carry out a regime of inspection, testing, repair and maintenance of all building services and systems. Records relevant to testing & maintenance are available for inspection at the council's offices but not on site as it is not practicable to store them. Evidence of planned preventative (PPM) schedules observed for maintenance on the G-drive, but it could not be ascertained whether these are current and still valid. Information awaited from compliance team as to testing and maintenance regimes.

8.1.4 Are external stairs and in particular those devised as a means of escape regularly inspected, maintained and appropriate for use in all weathers? Yes No N/A

8.1.5 Comments

May 2021- Due to the issues highlighted and subsequent reports, the fire strategy for the block has changed to simultaneous. Updated resident fire safety information packs and new fire action notices have been distributed/displayed. A fire assembly point has been introduced for residents.

Current waking watch personnel have received internal procedures and their main role has changed to 'evacuation management'

Communal fire alarm system is linked to a ARC system to summon fire rescue services.

PEEPS have been established for residents who have confirmed they require assistance in evacuation, this has been communicated with LFB.

Council Staff that frequently visit the building must be given regular fire safety training. This training clearly informs them what to do in the event of fire. Employees from other organisations are expected to have regular training on carrying out an evacuation in the event of an emergency. The training records are submitted to the council before these persons are allowed to visit council property.

Southwark carry out a regime of inspection, testing, repair and maintenance of all building services and systems in accordance with the relevant statutory regulations. Records relevant to testing & maintenance are available for inspection at the council's offices but not on site as it is not practicable to store them.

Action Plan

Issue No: 6.7.1.1

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is the standard of housekeeping adequate?
Issue	Although house keeping has improved significantly since last fire risk assessment, there were still some issues noted by the risk assessor. 9th floor - external balcony for maisonettes - clothes along the balcony - 10th floor - accumulation of rubbish within the lobby area - 4th floor - accumulation of rubbish within lobby area
Action	RSO to ensure cleaners regularly check/clean ALL communal areas of the block. Block will need to have 'zero tolerance' approach adopted temporarily.
Status	Resolved
Target Date	28/02/2020
Resolution	Issue resolved from Works Order: APEX-HSI-1045290

Images



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Issue No: 6.7.1.2

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is the standard of housekeeping adequate?
Issue	There was storage of combustible materials along the external balcony of the TRA Hall, including BBQ and timber. The balcony presents a fire load that could spread vertically up.
Action	RSO to liaise with TRA Hall and remove all combustible materials from external balcony. Instruct Hall users that they must not have any barbecue, or smoke, on any part of balcony.
Status	Resolved
Target Date	28/02/2020
Resolution	Issue resolved from Works Order: APEX-HSI-1045291

Issue No: 6.7.1.3

Priority HIGH
Location
Floor
Question Is the standard of housekeeping adequate?
Issue Access doors/rodding eyes - located on stairwells, one of the bin chutes were fully blocked
Action Instruct bin chute to be cleared to remove blockage.
Status Resolved
Target Date 06/03/2020
Resolution Issue resolved from Works Order: APEX-HSI-1045525

Images



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Issue No: 7.1.1.1

Priority MEDIUM
Location
Floor
Question Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue Significant breaches were identified to the block (please refer to body of report section 7.1.1) which compromises the fire safety integrity and compartmentation to support 'stay put' strategy. A full passive fire survey/type 4 is required to assess the current standards of the passive fire safety installations
Action A full passive fire survey via a 3rd party accredited contractor is required for this block, this block should also undertake a type 4 FRA survey in conjunction with the passive fire survey.
Status Outstanding
Target Date 28/04/2020
Comments Contractor instructed (Ventro) as per VD (FSM).

May 2021 - In December 2020 an intrusive survey to a void carried out by Phoenix Green (3rd party accredited contractor) which highlighted further breaches in fire compartmentation. A further intrusive fire risk assessment was carried out by same company in March 2021 - [REDACTED]. Fire stopping works have been completed to address breaches in compartmentation resulting from cabling for the installed communal fire alarm and detection system, labels located where works have been completed by Phoenix Green.


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Issue No: 7.1.1.2

Priority HIGH

Location

Floor

Question

Is compartmentation suitable?

Issue

Access panels to suspended ceiling which provide 1 hour fire resistance have been, in some cases damaged by water which compromise the fire performance. The lower level corridors had 15mm fire line board installed to the panel inner side.

Action Full inspection of all access panels to the suspended ceiling on all floors is required from competent person. Replace panels where required due to degrading of fire performance from water damage/rust. The fire integrity of the suspended ceiling should achieve 60 minutes fire resistance.

Status Outstanding

Target Date 28/02/2020

Comments May 2021 - intrusive fire risk assessment completed in March 2021, all required actions will form part of overall feasibility report being prepared by LBS and the programmed major works.

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Issue No: 7.1.1.3

Priority MEDIUM

Location

Floor

Question Is compartmentation suitable?

Issue Fire-resisting shutter/ fusible link in place to base of refuse chutes, although x 1 shutter was in the close position. No inspection records provided to assessor.

Action Confirm appropriate maintenance/inspection regime is in place for the fire-resisting fusible link refuse shutters.

Status Outstanding

Target Date 28/04/2020

Images



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Issue No: 7.1.1.4

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue	Access doors/rodding eyes - located on stairwells, previous FRA confirm they are 60 minutes FR, however on inspection, one of the bin chutes were fully blocked.
Action	Confirm access hatch provides 60 minutes fire/smoke resistance.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/02/2020

Images



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Issue No: 7.1.1.5

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue	The metal and timber panel between the ground floor lift lobby and the upper ground stairwell did not appear to be 60 minutes fire resisting.
Action	This panel should be upgraded to a 60 minutes fire resisting construction.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Identified in previous FRA work REF APEX-HSI-1025597

Issue No: 7.1.1.6

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue	Due to the concerns raised in this assessment with breaches in fire compartmentation/external facade and ventilation, a type 4 FRA survey is required.
Action	Type 4 – Common parts and flats (destructive), this is the most comprehensive fire risk assessment and should be a priority on the type 4 LBS schedule.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Contractor instructed (Ventro) for communal survey and building added to type 4 survey list as per VD (FSM). May 2021 - An intrusive void survey was completed in December 2020 and a further intrusive fire risk assessment completed in March 2021 - All required actions to be addressed and will form part of LBS feasibility report. To mitigate against this risk, waking watch was introduced in lat November 2020, since then a temporary fire alarm and detection system has been installed with a D1 LD1 system within each dwelling and communal fire alarm and detection system to a type L5 (communal detection with heat detection extended into each). Specifications agreed with LFB prior to design, relevant certification to be presented to LBS by fire alarm engineers on completion. Internal procedures have been developed in line with NFCC Simultaneous Evacuation Guidance Guidance to support a temporary change to a simultaneous evacuation strategy in purpose-built blocks of flats and should be read.

Issue No: 7.1.1.7

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue	Sprinkler system installed to bin store area, however it seems to have been isolated and decommissioned. No mitigating reasons was provided to assessor.
Action	To provide additional active fire protection to the bin stores, the sprinkler system should be in operation with required maintenance schedule, this forms part of block fire strategy. No information was provided to assessor to explain reasons for sprinkler system being disconnected. Reasoning behind why the sprinkler system is no longer in use is required to be provided to the assessor. If one cannot be provided then the sprinkler system should brought back into use and maintained accordingly.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/02/2020

Images



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Issue No: 7.1.1.8

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue	2nd floor server room, located off means of escape lobby not enclosed with 30 minutes fire resistance.
Action	Instruct 3rd party accredited competent person to separate server room from lobby/means of escape, ensuring 30 minutes fire resistance is achieved.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020

Images



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Issue No: 7.1.1.9

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is compartmentation suitable?
Issue	Update November 2020 - Following a reported smell of smoke at block, the FST attended Marie Curie on 09/11/20, during inspection fire breaches were noted to dwelling Number [REDACTED] - Email sent to Fire Safety Manager on same day to provide summary on findings.
Action	Address fire breaches identified during the site visit - Dwelling [REDACTED] in small void where AMOE is located on corridor landing, also it was confirmed some dwellings have vents located in hallways (LBS contractor Ductclean not aware of these locations).
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	23/12/2020
Comments	<p>May 2021 - A further void survey was completed in December 2020 which highlighted further breaches.</p> <p>Following the above and in liaison with the LFB, a waking watch was introduced in late November as a temporary measure as further investigations were completed on fire compartmentation. These arrangements provided a change in the evacuation strategy for this building, moving from Stay Put to Simultaneous Evacuation supported a Waking Watch. This was to enable people to continue to live in relative safety in their own homes, as these interim solutions were needed to mitigate the risk. The aim of a waking watch is to ensure there is sufficient warning in the event of fire to support the evacuation strategy. Internal procedures were developed in line with the NFCC Simultaneous Evacuation Guidance to support a temporary change to a simultaneous evacuation strategy in purpose-built blocks of flats. Please read the separate procedures implemented in conjunction with this FRA.</p>

Issue No: 7.1.3.1

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Where ducting is provided can it be ascertained if fire dampers are provided to prevent the spread of fire through compartments to protect the means of escape?
Issue	Previous FRA state the ductwork was cleaned and serviced in November 2012 and is now due for a further clean and inspection and should be placed on a programmed maintenance and cleaning schedule.
Action	Confirm maintenance and cleaning schedule is in place for ducting system and provide FST with relevant information.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/02/2020
Comments	May 2021 - It is understood this was completed in December 2020.

Issue No: 7.1.3.2

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	Where ducting is provided can it be ascertained if fire dampers are provided to prevent the spread of fire through compartments to protect the means of escape?
Issue	A full survey investigation into the communal ventilation system is required. As well as determining the type of systems and possible engineered solutions to eliminate spread of fire smoke at the early stages.
Action	Instruct competent contractor to complete full survey of ventilation system. Possible mitigating solution for the short term and of reducing the potential for fire spread between flats would be to fit intumescent fire dampers to the vents into the ducts. Although this would not restrict the spread of smoke in the early stages of a fire, it would prevent spread of flames and hot gases.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Survey to be programmed - no known issues as per VD (FSM). May 2021 - It has been confirmed that most dwellings have intumescent vents installed to bathroom extract which mitigates this risk. The extract system is to be removed as it is as part of the feasibility report proposals. Ensure all other dwellings have intumescent vents installed as an interim to further mitigate this risk. May 2021 - A survey of the grilles within some dwellings has been completed, no significant issues in regards to risk of fire/smoke spread was reported.

Images



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Issue No: 7.2.1.1

Priority	CRITICAL
Location	
Floor	
Question	Are there adequate provisions for exits in the area assessed?
Issue	The fire escape door between the open balcony escapes and the stair lobbies to the maisonette upper levels at the 12th floor serving flats [REDACTED] (rear of the building) and the 2nd floor serving flats [REDACTED] (rear of the building). These doors must be eased and adjusted to allow them to open freely, assessor could not open when checked, possible lock failure. Urgent defect.

Action Repair locks to ensure they can open freely. Assessor to report prior to FRA completions.
Status Resolved
Target Date 05/02/2020
Comments Completed under WO Reference 8815546/1, with photo evidence supplied by contractor 27.04.2020 (next working day)
Resolution Locks ease and adjusted by contractor (BuildTrust) - Photo evidence supplied.

Issue No: 7.2.1.2

Priority LOW
Location
Floor
Question Are there adequate provisions for exits in the area assessed?
Issue Some push pads in general were stiff, these should be replaced during next major works to ensure easy openable mechanism for residents to use in event of fire.
Action Replace push pads on fire exit doors from balconies during next major works programme. RSO to ensure these are checked as part of their monthly inspections.
Status Outstanding
Target Date 28/01/2021
Comments May 2021 - Waking watch provide regular patrols to check these balcony exit doors, this risk is to be included in the feasibility report prior to major works agreed.

Images




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Issue No: 7.2.4.1

Priority MEDIUM
Location
Floor
Question Is there suitable protection for the escape routes? This is to include any glazing.
Issue To the external balcony means of escape, there are installed UPVC panels at full length. It could not be confirmed if these panels would achieve 60 minutes fire resistance.
Action Instruct 3rd party accredited contractor to replace panels with fire resistance materials to provide 60 minutes fire separation. These panels were located by the fire exit door from the external balconies.
Status Outstanding
Target Date 28/04/2020
Comments May 2021 - This issue has been included within the feasibility report for the major works.

Images



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Issue No: 7.4.1.1

Priority	LOW
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is there reasonable provision for all notices?
Issue	Exit route signage was found missing in the following locations and must be replaced within the stair case 14th floor down to the security door at 13th floor level.
Action	Supply and fit an 3A sign at the bottom of the stair at 13th floor pointing towards the door.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/01/2021
Comments	Identified in previous FRA work Ref APEX-HSI-1039694

Issue No: 7.4.1.2

Priority	LOW
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is there reasonable provision for all notices?
Issue	14th floor fire escape via main stairs has a metal door on 13th floor, there 'no turn lock' sign to the snib lock or 'fire exit keep clear' sign to the outer side of door.
Action	Install relevant fire signage to the metal door located on the 14th/13th floor internal staircase.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	12/05/2022

Issue No: 7.4.2.1

Priority	LOW
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is there suitable signage for automatic, self closing and locked fire doors?
Issue	The following signage is required to the fire doors. Fire door keep shut to both sides of all fire exit doors including all balcony exits, stair and chute lobby doors (2x signs per door 2x doors /floor ([redacted] in total).
Action	Supply and fit signage as detailed.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/01/2021
Comments	Identified in previous FRA work Ref APEX-HSI-1039695

Issue No: 7.4.2.2

Priority	LOW
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is there suitable signage for automatic, self closing and locked fire doors?
Issue	Turn to open signage on the metal security door leading from the 14th floor into the 13th floor landing.
Action	Supply and fit signage as detailed.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/01/2021
Comments	Identified in previous FRA Ref APEX-HSI-1039697

Issue No: 7.5.1.1

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Does the common area of the building have an automatic detection and warning fire alarm system?
Issue	A domestic smoke detection system was installed and understood to be linked into a sprinkler suppression system to the ground floor bin rooms/electrical intake and store room. Controls were located within the electrical intake within one of these bin rooms, shut off valve within the rear bin room. This system seem to be live still.
Action	Instruct competent person to assess if fire detection system is still live and interface with sprinkler system. Assessor could not confirm if system is monitored remotely. Once this information is clear, the FST will assess if the smoke detection can be removed or not. It also needs to be clarified why a BS5839 Part 6 was installed.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/02/2020
Comments	May 2021 - The new temporary fire alarm and detection system has extended heat detection into the bin store to mitigate against this risk. Confirmation on current system/sprinklers still required from repairs team.

Images



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Issue No: 7.6.1.1

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is it considered that the premises has been provided with reasonable means of smoke ventilation in the event of a fire?
Issue	In blocks of flats designed with corridor smoke dispersal systems, consideration should be given to providing cross-corridor doors to change to a smoke containment approach, but maintain the OVs or PVs to ventilate the sections of corridor remaining. Advice from a specialist should be sought if smoke dispersal is present in single stairway buildings.
Action	A full smoke control strategy survey is recommended to be completed via a cost risk analyst report by a competent contractor for LBS to consider during next major works. Recent fire safety works carried out at the sister block, Lakanal should also be taken into consideration.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/02/2020
Comments	May 2021 - AOV upgrade should be considered during next major works via a LBS feasibility study as so should potential retrofit of automatic fire suppression system (AFSS), taking into account guidance at the time. This should form part of a risk analyst approach on the overall holistic risk of the block and provide a proportionate to the risk approach to establish best safety solutions for residents. A separate fire strategy has been completed for the block which has provided an engineered solution which is currently under review as part of the feasibility review.

Issue No: 7.6.1.2

Priority	LOW
Location	
Floor	
Question	Is it considered that the premises has been provided with reasonable means of smoke ventilation in the event of a fire?
Issue	There is no natural permanent ventilation (PV) within the bin stores located on ground floor
Action	Install PV to bin stores during next major works.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/01/2021

Issue No: 7.6.4.1

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	If permanently ventilated in the stair is there sufficient free area?
Issue	The stairwell was found to have a large PV at the base of the stair (upper ground level) near the T&RA hall entrance and additional ventilation holes within the final exit door. This may allow smoke from any fire within the T&RA hall into the stairwell and the current best practice recommends that there is no ventilation provided at the base of the stair to improve the draw.
Action	Using the required fire resistance materials, cover the open areas within the upper ground stairwell (near the T&RA entrance door) and cover the holes within the final exit door from the stairwell at upper ground level to remove the PV to this area.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Identified in previous FRA work Ref APEX-HSI-1039751

Issue No: 7.7.5.1

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	

Question Issue	Does the front entry door have a firefighter's override? The emergency services drop key overrides are defective to the following doors, 13th floor serving the corridor to flats [REDACTED] 9th floor serving flats, 7th floor serving the corridor to flats [REDACTED]
Action	Repair these drop key overrides as detailed.
Status	Resolved
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Completed under Work Ref APEX-HSI-1045312
Resolution	Completed under Work Ref APEX-HSI-1045312

Issue No: 7.7.14.1

Priority	LOW
Location	
Floor	
Question Issue	Where fitted does the Premises Information Box contain the correct and relevant information? Currently no premises information box installed by entrance like it sister block, Lakanal House.
Action	Install PIB by main entrance. Ensure correct level of documentation is in place as per the LFB PIB GN (Guidance Note).
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/01/2021
Comments	May 2021 - A PIB is now on order to be installed by the entrance. The current waking watch team have PEEPS and procedures in place to liaise with the arriving fire rescue services, also procedures and PEEPS have been sent via email. LFB conduct regular site visits for familiarisation of the block/PEEPS and procedures.

Issue No: 7.8.1.1

Priority	HIGH
Location	
Floor	
Question Issue	Are all dwelling front entry doors and hardware (where required) compliant with certification carried out to BS476-22/BSEN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value? (Consider seals and strips) A full fire door survey is required including the communal fire doors and FEDs. Information on fire door manufacturers instructions and fire door certificates should be obtained and provided to FST.
Action	Instruct 3rd party accredited contractor to complete full fire door survey, including communal fire doors and FEDs. This should form part of a risk base programme of FED/fire door inspection as per BS8214.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/02/2020
Comments	May 2021 - Further surveys since December 2020 have highlighted issues with fire doors in general. Replacement of all fire doors with certified FD30s (FD60s in some communal areas) is being looked at as part of feasibility report.

Issue No: 7.8.1.2

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question Issue	Are all dwelling front entry doors and hardware (where required) compliant with certification carried out to BS476-22/BSEN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value? (Consider seals and strips) Once a full fire door survey is completed, including communal fire doors, a fire door risk assessment is required to provide a risk base approach strategy for LBS to work to in regards to any works required on repair/replacement.

Action Once information is collated, instruct competent person to provide a fire door risk assessment.
Status Outstanding
Target Date 29/04/2020
Comments May 2021 - Further surveys since December 2020 have highlighted issues with fire doors in general. Replacement of all fire doors with certified FD30s (FD60s in some communal areas) is being looked at as part of feasibility report.

Issue No: 7.8.2.1

Priority HIGH
Location
Floor
Question Are all cross corridor, stair and lobby doors certified to a test regime under BS476-22 or BS EN 1634-1 or of a suitable notional value?
Issue Below are the following issues identified with communal fire doors; 9th floor - fire door not closing not frame to staircase - 11th floor - fire door to lift lobby missing intumescent smoke seals/ fire door to bin chute room not closing fully into frame
Action 13th floor - fire door to bin chute room, intumescent strips missing - 1st floor - fire door to staircase, gaps around the door frame/substrate - 4th floor - fire door to bin chute room not closing fully into frame. All assessments and repairs should be carried out in line with the manufacturer's instructions by a suitably qualified person or organisation that can demonstrate the appropriate levels of skill and competency. Certification under a UKAS accredited door installer scheme would be a way of establishing those criteria.
Status Outstanding
Target Date 28/02/2020
Comments May 2021 - Further surveys since December 2020 have highlighted issues with fire doors in general. Replacement of all fire doors with certified FD30s (FD60s in some communal areas) is being looked at as part of feasibility report.

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Issue No: 7.8.6.1

Priority MEDIUM
Location
Floor

Question	Do all fire doors have self closing devices compliant with BS EN 1154? Where not applicable are fire doors kept locked shut?
Issue	All FEDs and flat escape doors into the protected corridors were multi-lock 30 minute fire doors (FD30s SC) fitted some 9-10 years ago, following an sample inspection they were found to be fitted with intumescent strips, smoke seals & a single Perkomatic self closing device,
Action	Single Perkos are not considered to meet the standard required and should be replaced by door closers to BS EN 1154.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Identified in previous FRA work Ref APEX-HSI-1039758 May 2021 - Further surveys since December 2020 have highlighted issues with fire doors in general. Replacement of all fire doors with certified FD30s (FD60s in some communal areas) is being looked at as part of feasibility report.

Issue No: 7.9.3.1

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	Does the building's exterior wall contain infill panels?
Issue	Minimal information was presented to the assessor in regards to external facade spandrel panels. Data sheets and more detail from the panel inspection in March 2019 is required, which confirmed the current build up fails building regulations compliance.
Action	It is recommended LBS ensure they implement, if they have not done so already, the short-term Interim Measures set out in section 11 of MHCLG - Advice for Building Owners of Multi-storey, Multi-occupied Residential Buildings. LBS should also seek professional advice from a qualified chartered professional with relevant experience in fire safety, including fire testing of building products and systems where applicable and liaise with fire authorities.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	28/04/2020
Comments	Panel identified - Replacement work programmed 2020/21 as per VD (FSM). May 2021 - An inspection has taken place within number [REDACTED] Marie Curie House regarding below-window panels. With the subsequent report dated 21/03/19. The report confirms as follows: The block is over 18M in height. Aluminium cladding panels are in-situ and said cladding panels form approximately 40% of the elevation. There are 4No. materials identified within the panel. These are as follows: Aluminium (1.3mm), cement particle board (5.8mm), insulation (phenolic type foam) (20.3mm) & Aluminium (1.6mm). The sample was taken from a bedroom within the property. Based on this inspection, it is now apparent that the panels in-situ are non-compliant with modern Building Regulations and are believed to be a fire risk to the block if left unaddressed. Under Building Regulations Part B, the external wall construction of buildings of storey height of 18 Metres or more must be constructed of Euroclass A1 or A2 fire rated.

Issue No: 8.1.1.1

Priority	MEDIUM
Location	
Floor	
Question	Are procedures in the event of fire appropriate and properly documented?
Issue	Due to issues raised within this report in regards to breaches in fire compartmentation, standard of fire doors and external facade, an assessment of the current 'stay put' strategy will be required.
Action	Once the tasks on the issues mentioned have been addressed, instruct a competent person to assess whether a 'stay put' strategy is still appropriate for this block, in discussion with the local fire and rescue service. This assessment must be recorded and communicated to all relevant persons.
Status	Outstanding
Target Date	29/04/2020

Comments

May 2021 - Since the issues in breaches in fire compartmentation has been raised, a waking watch has been installed (November 2020) to the block as an interim measure to mitigate against this risk. The temporary fire alarm and detection system has since also been installed (May 2021) with waking watch still in place (main role is now evacuation management) with less personnel. The dwellings have had D1 LD1 system installed. The communal AFD system is linked to a remote alarm receiving monitoring centre (ARC). Update resident fire safety information packs have been distributed to residents as part of the resident engagement process and a list of vulnerable residents developed and PEEPS put into place. LFB have been notified during this process to ensure operational information is up to date.

Issue No: 8.1.2.1**Priority** MEDIUM**Location****Floor****Question**

Have staff and relevant individuals been given appropriate fire safety training?

Issue

No fire training records/information was supplied to assessor at time of assessment to clarify competence of persons involvement relating to fire safety at the block. This would include the RSO, staff leading on required works including maintenance, refurbishment of any part of the block. All contractors used should be 3rd party accredited with FST input during key stages of any future works with appropriate sign off checking the quality of fire safety works/collation of relevant fire safety information through appropriate LBS procedures and processes

Action

Confirm appropriate training is in place to ensure acceptable level of competency for those involved in fire safety within the block. Confirm contractors used are 3rd party accredited and that relevant checks on works/information is in place via appropriate LBS procedures and processes. This also forms part of one of the recommendations from the rule 43 letter after the Lakanal House enquiry which is the sister block of Marie Curie.

Status

Outstanding

Target Date

28/04/2020

Comments

May 2021 - Waking watch currently in place who conduct regular patrols have received fire training. Contractors used for the intrusive survey are 3rd party accredited in passive fire protection. Ensure all contractors involved in fire safety works moving forward are 3rd party accredited.